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FOREWORD
NANCY EHRENREICH*
Law professors have been drawing upon the work of philosopher
Jirgen Habermas for years, finding countless applications of his dis-
course ethics theory to legal issues. But the publication of Habermas's
formidable work on law and democracy, Between Facts and Norms,'
provides an occasion for legal scholars to engage Habermas's ideas about
law per se, and to assess his arguments about its role and function in
democratic societies. This Symposium represents one set of such assess-
ments. The product of a collaborative effort among legal scholars and
other social theorists, it also constitutes an interdisciplinary conversation
on Habermas's recent exploration of law and democracy.
That conversation actually began here in Denver well over a year
ago, when the University of Denver College of Law selected Between
Facts and Norms as the subject of our fifth annual legal theory sympo-
sium. The symposium is a small, workshop-like conference, designed to
provide a forum for the examination of a particular problem or concept in
legal theory that arises across various legal contexts. Interdisciplinary in
its focus, the symposium is preceded by a year-long reading group in
which law professors and interested scholars from other disciplines meet
weekly to explore and discuss writings relevant to that year's topic. This
year's reading group included individuals from the fields of philosophy,
psychology, and political science, as well as law. The articles printed
here reflect the rich and stimulating mix of ideas generated by those
reading group sessions, as well as by the panel presentation in which the
year-long symposium process culminated.'
Before introducing the Symposium papers, I would like to take a
moment to thank three individuals who contributed immensely to the
success of this enterprise. Interdisciplinary interactions are always
fraught with challenge and promise, and this one was no exception.
Three contributors to this volume, Mitchell Aboulafia, Myra Bookman,
* Assoc. Prof. of Law, University of Denver College of Law. I would like to thank Mitchell
Aboulafia, Myra Bookman, Catherine Kemp, and Charles Pot for their comments on an earlier draft
of this Foreword. All errors are, of course, mine.
I. JORGEN KABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (1998).
2. This year, we deviated from our traditional format, taking advantage of the opportunity to
hold the symposium in conjunction with the annual conference of the Society of Phenomenology and
Existential Philosophy. Professor Habermas, who generously contributed a conference paper to the
Symposium, was the keynote speaker at that conference, and three of our symposium contributors
appeared on a panel following his remarks.
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and Catherine Kemp, played a crucial role in our weekly reading group,
contextualizing and translating Habermas's ideas for those of us law
types who were unfamiliar with the larger body of his work. Their ability
to discuss complex concepts in straightforward language, and their pa-
tience with the seemingly endless debates that often turned out to be
more about terminology than substance, made the reading group an in-
credibly productive and stimulating undertaking for all concerned.
Moreover, all three, and especially Catherine Kemp, provided helpful
contacts and suggestions during the organizing of what turned out to be a
very successful live panel on Habermas and law.
The way that Habermas approaches the task he sets for himself in
Between Facts and Norms is so ambitious and expansive---even the
nooks and crannies in his argument are more like caves and canyons-
that any attempt to summarize it seems doomed to failure.' Nevertheless,
a brief overview can serve to set the stage for the pieces printed here.
Hopefully, readers (and Habermas himself) will forgive the necessarily
un-nuanced nature of any such effort.
The central project of Between Facts and Norms is huge and im-
portant: to articulate a theory of the legitimacy of the legal order in a
complex society such as the United States or Germany. According to
Habermas, the diversity of modern societies has destroyed the moral
consensus that characterized an earlier era," while the decline of religion
has caused natural law to lose its moorings to divine authority. These
developments, combined with the fact that individuals do not directly
participate in or consent to the production of society's laws, create a
problem of legal legitimacy. How can we justify the application of coer-
cive force to citizens who might not agree with the reasons for its appli-
cation and have not directly participated in the decision to apply it?
Habermas sees this problem as a conflict between "facticity" and
"validity"-between, on the one hand, the existence of law as a social
fact and, on the other hand, its legitimacy as the expression of a norm.
The conflict could also be characterized as one between fidelity to law
and justice--or, if you will, between positivism and natural law. How
can we reconcile the social reality of law as the product of power strug-
gles acted out in concrete social institutions with law's claim to legiti-
3. There have actually been many attempts to summarize Between Facts and Norms, though
none as short as the one that follows here. The translator summarizes the argument in a lengthy, and
very helpful, introduction to the book, and Habermas himself does the same (with some additions
and clarifications) in a postscript at the end. His article in this Symposium is yet another--and still
useful!--take on the argument.
4. Habermas seems to assume a premodem world characterized by uniformity and consen-
sus--a world that, in fact, may never have existed.
5. Catherine Kemp, Habermas Among the Americans: Some Reflections on the Common
Law, 76 DENY. U. L. REV. 961,963 (1999).
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macy as the expression ofpubic norms with which compliance can le-
gitimately be demanded? Like many legal theorists who have tried to
transcend the terms of the debate between classical legal theorists and
legal realists, Habermas wants to salvage the moral neutrality of law
without denying the moral pluralism of modem society. Seeking to con-
struct a legal edifice whose legitimacy does not depend upon the sub-
stantive content of its rules, he proposes a not-unfamiliar solution: a
"proceduralist" approach to law.
Between Facts and Norms reads like a highly sophisticated and am-
bitious version of process theory. Incorporating his earlier work on dis-
course ethics into this new meditation on law, Habermas ties the legiti-
macy of law to its production through a democratic process characterized
by communicative action. "Just those [legal] action norms are valid," he
writes, "to which all possibly affected persons could agree as participants
in rational discourses." This "discourse principle" is the central focus of
his book.
Offering communicative action as a "postmetaphysical" definition
of reason, Habermas's theory thus appears to present a means of ration-
ally resolving disputes that does not fall prey to the universalizing for-
malism of classical theory. Resisting a naive equation of democracy with
the existence of formal institutional structures such as elected legisla-
tures, it also promises a proceduralist approach that takes seriously the
need to articulate a standard for defining the conditions necessary for
meaningful democratic decision making. Law's role, says Habermas, is
to translate democracy into government-to facilitate the formation of
the views of the people and incorporate them into institutional legal
structures, to serve as the mechanism by which popular will becomes
positive law. The legal "norms" generated as he suggests will be legitimate
precisely because they are the product of a genuinely democratic process
in which each person has an equal opportunity to articulate his or her
interests and views-a process that accords with the discourse principle.
In his Symposium conference paper,7 Professor Habermas provides
a helpful and informative summary of the material covered in his book.
He cites six specific topics to which he believes the book contributes:
I. The form and function of modem law;
II. The relation between law and morality;
II. The relation between humab rights and popular sovereignty;
IV. The epistemic function of democracy;
6. HABERMAS, supra note 1, at 107.
7. JUrgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: An Author's Reflections, 76 DENY. U. L.
REv. 937 (1999).
1999]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
V. The central role of public communication in mass-democracy;
VI. The debate about competing paradigms of law.'
Habermas begins his discussion by setting out his view of law as a me-
dium of social integration, and argues that legitimacy is essential to that
role. He turns next to "the relation between law and morality," arguing
that the "legitimacy of law must not be assimilated to moral validity, nor
should law be completely separated from morality.""0 Under the third
topic he presents his "view [of] the democratic process from the stand-
point of discourse theory."" The sorts of human rights that "empower
citizens to exercise their political autonomy," he argues, are "what is
necessary for the legal institutionalization of the democratic process of
self-legislation.""2 Next, he briefly summarizes his rejection of a "men-
talist conception of reason" in favor of a "pragmatist" approach that fo-
cuses on the conditions necessary for democratic deliberation." In the
succeeding part of the piece, he stresses the importance of the structural
features of public, political communication to the successful creation of
the deliberative democracy he seeks. Finally, in the last part of the paper,
Habermas contrasts his "proceduralist paradigm" of law with two alter-
native views: the "liberal paradigm" and the "welfare-state paradigm."'"
Habermas's summary of Between Facts and Norms is followed by
Mitchell Aboulafia's article, Law Professors Read Habermas." Consis-
tent with his role as able (and essential) translator in the symposium
reading group, Professor Aboulafia provides a lucid, extremely accessi-
ble overview of Habermas's proceduralist theory. Particularly useful is
his exegesis on Habermas's ideas regarding the relationship among indi-
vidual rights, law, and democracy. Aboulafia explains,
For Habermas, rights are necessary for a discursively achieved politi-
cal will-formation. The alternative would be to have the "will" of po-
litical actors shaped from above or by tradition .... Without rights
protecting private "space," democracy would be unrealizable because
citizens could not form themselves as autonomous agents; and with-
out democracy law would not have the proper grounds for legitimacy;
and without law that is legitimate, rights (public and private) would
not be properly protected. And, of course, without public rights, dis-




9. Id. at 937.
10. Id. at 938-39.
11. Id. at 939.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 940.
14. Id. at 942.
15. Mitchell Aboulafia, Law Professors Read Habermas, 76 DENV. U. L. REV. 943 (1999).
16. Id. at 948.
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In passing, the piece also provides helpful clarification of the philosophi-
cal meaning of the terms "ethical life" and "morality""-terms that ini-
tially befuddled law professors in the symposium reading group, who
tended to equate both of them with "politics" as used in the Critical Le-
gal Studies aphorism, "law is politics."
Habermas is not, of course, without his critics, and the remainder of
our authors articulate a variety of points of disagreement, some more
minor and others more major, with his approach. A useful exploration of
the similarities and differences between Habermas and John Rawls is
provided by David Rasmussen in Accommodating Republicanism.'8
Drawing on an earlier pair of articles by the two theorists, Rasmussen
describes their exchange as a debate over whether it is, possible to "real-
ize justice as fairness while assuring impartiality in a process that is emi-
nently democratic."'9 Both authors are trying to accommodate republi-
canism's critique of liberalism, he maintains, but they do so in different
ways. Habermas indicts Rawls, Rasmussen explains, for falling prey to
the liberal tendency to overemphasize private rights and underemphasize
public decision making processes. Habermas sees public and private
autonomy as co-original, as presupposing each other. Since "private right
can only be derived from the process of public will-formation,"' private
autonomy must be grounded in democratic processes. Rawls, in contrast,
does not see private rights as democratically grounded, and thus, from
Habermas's point of view, pays insufficient attention to "the procedure
of democratic lawmaking."2' Rasmussen turns briefly at the end of his
piece to Rawls' critique of Habermas, which he summarizes thusly: "[I]f
one asserts the co-originality thesis in the way that Habermas does, with
its implicit assumption about the primacy of the political in the classical,
as opposed to the modern sense, then one buys into a teleology which
can only be justified through a comprehensive philosophical frame-
work." This criticism, Rasmussen contends, has not yet been replied to
by Habermas.
Catherine Kemp, in her article, Habermas Among the Americans:
Some Reflections on the Common Law,23 criticizes Between Facts and
Norms for being inattentive to differences between the German civil law
system and the Anglo-American common law system. In a creative and
thought-provoking argument, Kemp draws on Holmes' notion that judi-
cial rulings emerge from experience in order to suggest that Habermas's
treatment of customary law as part of the positive law provides an inade-
quate model for understanding common law systems. Following Frederic
17. See id. at 946.
18. David M. Rasmussen, Accommodating Republicanism, 76 DENY. U. L. REv. 955 (1999).
19. Id. at 956.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 957.
22. Id. at 960 (citation omitted).
23. Kemp, supra note 5, at 961.
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Kellogg, ' Kemp points out that, for Holmes, common law rules are not
created out of whole cloth by judges but rather are derived through a
process of "successive approximation" generated by the repeated experi-
ence of resolving particular types of disputes. ' If this view is correct, she
continues, then it might not be appropriate to equate common law rules
with the legislatively enacted legal norms on which Habermas focuses.
This part of our positive law, Kemp's argument suggests, may be less
removed from, and more organically connected to, popular understand-
ings than Habermas imagines North American legal enactments to be. A
common law system like that in the United States may not suffer from
the same tension between facticity and validity that, according to
Habermas, characterizes modern law.
Psychologist Myra Bookman, in her piece, Still Facing "The Di-
lemma of the Fact": Gilligan and Habermas (Re)Visited,' likewise sees
Habermas's theory as incomplete, but because of conceptual rather than
cultural gaps. Drawing on the work of Carol Gilligan as interpreted "pro-
gressively" by Mary Joe Frug, Bookman makes a persuasive case for the
argument that Habermas's legitimation theory "refuses to relinquish a
model of psychological and social development that relies on autonomy,
separation, and individuation as its ground note."' Habermas's focus on
democracy, autonomy, and equality imports a particular substantive per-
spective into what he claims to be, in her words, a "postmetaphysical,
strictly procedural, normatively empty position."'" Rejecting the "vulgar
Gilliganist" view that associates such a perspective with men and the
alternative "ethic of care" perspective with women, Bookman maintains
that Habermas's treatment is nevertheless incomplete as long as it fails to
attend to the latter, alternative approach to morality. She does not, how-
ever, conclude from her finding of substance in Habermas's substance-
less position, that his project of producing a neutral, non-normative defi-
nition of democracy is misguided. For her, the solution is to incorporate
within Habermas's existing analysis a view of "a lifeworld fraught with
attachment, vulnerability, and relational responsibility-a lifeworld be-
yond ego, separation, and blind fairness."-' The "justice" and "care" per-
spectives, she argues, can "coexist in productive tension."3'
In contrast to Bookman's pluralist solution to the substantivity she
finds in Between Facts and Norms, the three remaining articles in our
24. See Frederic R. Kellogg, Legal Scholarship in the Temple of Doom: Pragmatism's Re-
sponse to Critical Legal Studies, 65 TuLANE L. REv. 15 (1990).
25. Kemp, supra note 5, at 968-69.
26. "Myra Bookman, Still Facing "The Dilemma of the Fact": Gilligan and Habermas
(Re)Visited, 76 DENY. U. L. REv. 977 (1999).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 978.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 979.
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Symposium suggest at least the possibility that the substantive assump-
tions that implicitly ground Habermas's book might doom the entire un-
dertaking. In The View of Habermas from Below: Doubts About the
Centrality of Law and the Legitimation Enterprise,32 Brian Tamanaha
shows that critiques of dense philosophical theorists like Habermas can
be trenchant without being tortuous. Tamanaha begins this admirably
readable piece by questioning the usefulness of jurisprudential theories
that focus on trying to identify the source of law's legitimacy. Such in-
quiries, he argues, seem all too often to result not in legal critique (the
law has failed to live up to applicable standards) but in legal apologetics
(the standard of success is precisely what the law is already doing). This
is especially true, he suggests, when the standard that is articulated is an
idealized one that no system could ever fully meet. Moreover, Tamanaha
argues, discourse theory is not a persuasive form of legitimation. In fact,
in privileging discourse as the embodiment of democracy, Habermas has
actually created an analysis that is biased in favor of those who are good
at talking. Just like other formally neutral rules applied to social contexts
characterized by inequality, Habermas's discourse principle will produce
disparate results-favoring those with locutionary abilities over those
without. The actual substantive results of legal rulings, Tamanaha sug-
gests, may ultimately be more central to law's legitimacy than whether
those results were reached in accordance with a discourse theory of law.
Like Tamanaha, Frank Michelman believes that Habermas's dis-
course principle is itself substantive, given that it is "concerned with and
reflect[s] a particular way or form of life . . . that prefers honest
reasoning with each other to force and manipulation." '33 In his evocative
essay, Morality, Identity and "Constitutional Patriotism," Michelman
examines Habermas's offer of what Michelman calls a "constitutional
contractarian model of political justification."' Habermas, like Rawls,
believes that law gets its legitimacy from following certain fundamental
constitutional principles upon which all can agree.35 A necessary corol-
lary of this constitutional contractarian justification is the notion of a
shared attitude among the citizenry towards the constitution. Habermas
calls this attitude "constitutional patriotism."
31. Brian Tamanaha, The View of Habermas from Below: Doubts About the Centrality of Law
and the Legitimation Enterprise, 76 DENv. U. L. REv. 989 (1999).
32. Frank Michelman, Morality, Identity, and "Constitutional Patriotism," 76 DENy. U. L.
REV. 1009, 1027 (1999).
33. Id. at 1014 (emphasis in original).
34. Michelman quotes Rawls' formulation: "[Ojur exercise of political power is... justifiable
... when it is in accordance with a constitution, the essentials of which all citizens may be expected
to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and rational." /d
(alteration in original) (quoting JOHN RAWLS, POLmcAL LIBERALISM 216 (1993)). As Michelman
elaborates further, "Habermasians seek to establish the possibility and general characteristics (at
least) of a political regime that is rationally acceptable-acceptable considering one's interests--to
everyone who is (hypothetically) reasonable. They furthermore seek to do so without supposing any
substantive-ethical commonality among the people concerned." Id. at 1019.
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But the diversity of opinions about how to interpret a constitution,
Michelman suggests, raises problems for the constitutional patriotism
concept. So does the fact that any constitutional document that is phrased
generally enough for all to accept will be so broad as to preclude mean-
ingful conclusions about when and whether it is being violated.' The
very difficulty that a constitutional contractarian justification purports to
avert-that posed by the moral pluralism of modem society-thus
merely reasserts itself at the level of constitutional interpretation. Using
affirmative action as an example, Michelman shows how a constitutional
principle such as "equality of concern and respect" can be interpreted to
legitimate either a "color-blind" or an "anti-caste" approach to questions
of race-conscious lawmaking." (We do seem doomed to forever re-learn
Holmes' admonition that abstract rules cannot decide concrete cases ... )
Thus, he argues, the substantive judgments that Habermas attempts to
avoid resurface in his supposedly "removed, framing principles."'38
Michelman attempts to salvage the constitutional patriotism con-
cept, however, by invoking Habermas's argument that, despite the "lin-
guistic turn" in recent social theory (the idea that language constructs
reality), there are "universalist tendencies" in how people communicate
with each other." Habermas, explains Michelman, argues that two people
will be motivated to try to understand each other only if they both as-
sume there's a "point of convergence"-"a single object at hand, of
which the parties are giving competing accounts." This point, says
Michelman, suggests that, for Habermas, citizens see their disagreement
over issues like affirmative action not as a disagreement about the con-
tent of the relevant constitutional norms, but rather as a conflict over the
nature of the context in which those norms are applied."' "[I]t must be,"
says Michelman, "the idea of the constitution that does the crucial work
in a constitutional contractarian justification of politics, because there
can be no settled agreement among a country's people on a description of
35. See id. at 1023.
36. Id.
37. Id. "There will have to be," Michelman concludes, "some way in which citizens perceive
even their most intractable and divisive disagreements over the application of constitutional norms
to be directed to something other than the content of the norms." Id. at 1025.
38. See Jirgen Habermas, Hermeneutic and Analytic Philosophy: Two Complementary Ver-
sions of the Linguistic Turn? (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Society for Phenome-
nology and Existential Philosophy, Denver, Colorado, 1999) (oh file with the Denver University Law
Review).
39. Michelman, supra note 33, at 1013.
40. This is how Michelman puts it:
Given disagreements over applications of essential constitutional norms,
citizens don't have to ascribe them to ambiguity or vagrancy of meaning
in the norms themselves. We might rather ascribe their applicational dis-
agreements to uncertainty or disagreement about exactly who we think
we are and aim to be as politically constituted people, where we think we




the actual thing in all its concrete specificity." 2 "Constitutional patriot-
ism," Michelman concludes, must mean,
the morally necessitated readiness of a country's people to accept dis-
agreement over the application of core constitutional principles of re-
spect for everyone as free and equal, without loss of confidence in the
univocal content of the principles, because and as long as they can
understand the disagreement as strictly tied to struggles over consti-
tutional identity.41
But this readiness, Michelman argues, is necessarily empirical and con-
tingent," and therefore cannot be the basis of a universalist, proceduralist
theory such as that presented in Between Facts and Norms.
Finally, the most far-reaching of the critiques presented in this
Symposium is the piece by Rosemary Coombe with Jonathan Cohen,
entitled, The Law and Late Modem Culture: Reflections on Between
Facts and Norms from the Perspective of Critical Cultural Legal
Studies." An elegant variation on the familiar Critical Legal Studies ar-
gument deconstructing the public/private dichotomy, this article argues
that Habermas's view of law as an autonomous intermediary between the
lifeworld and the administrative apparatus of government ignores the fact
that law shapes the political world he sees it as merely mediating. Law's
role is as much about constructing disputes, the authors maintain, as re-
solving them.'
Coombe and Cohen also take Tamanaha's critique of the focus on
discourse a step further, questioning not only the ability of all citizens to
succeed at the communication Habermas describes, but also the exclu-
sion from his analysis of a variety of other possible forms of political
expression, such as popular music and religious oratory. Relying on the
work of Iris Marion Young, Coombe and Cohen suggest that, by elevat-
ing a form of communication-"rational" argument-that is most valued
by and engaged in by the dominant groups in society, Habermas rein-
forces the very power he sees as needing challenging.
In addition, the authors of this piece take Habermas to task for ig-
noring the corporate structuring of meaning-making activities in late-
twentieth-century society, as well as the government's role in regulating
those activities. Like law and lifeworld, politics and culture (including
41. Id. at 1022.
42. Id. at 1026 (emphasis in original).
43. Id. at 1027-28.
44. Rosemary J. Coombe with Jonathan Cohen, The Law and Late Modem Culture: Reflec-
tions on Between Facts and Norms from the Perspective of Critical Cultural Legal Studies, 76
DENv. U. L. REV. 1029 (1999).
45. "Law is not simply an institutional forum or legitimating discdurse to which social groups
turn to have pre-existing differences recognized, but, more crucially, a central locus for the control
and dissemination of those signifying forms with which identities and difference are made and
remade." Il at 1035.
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the economic marketplace) are not mutually exclusive categories. Politi-
cal views are significantly affected by corporate media; the media do not
merely serve as a conduit for the political expressions of the citizenry,
but rather help to set the terms of the discussion. And law, in regulating
corporate media entities, reinforces and makes possible the effect that
those entities have. Drawing on intellectual property concepts as an il-
lustration, Coombe and Cohen show how legal rules protecting the pro-
ductions of multimedia corporate conglomerates, under the legal fiction
that they are protecting "authorship," actually reinforce those entities'
deadening hegemony over the forms of production of mass culture. In so
doing, law becomes implicated in the very process of political will for-
mation from which it is supposed to derive its legitimacy.
From complementary commentary to corrosive critique, this set of
papers provides an informative and thought-provoking perusal of Be-
tween Facts and Norms. It also memorializes a year of fruitful interdis-
ciplinary exchange here at the University of Denver. Hopefully, it will
inspire its readers to undertake similar cross-disciplinary inquiries in the
future, as well as to engage Professor Habermas's important ideas about
democracy and law.
[Vol. 76:4
